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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court decline to consider Respondent's 
arguments when he fails to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's decision, ignoring the substantial evidence that 
supports the trial court's decision? 
"When the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, [the 
Court] refuse[s] to consider the merits of challenges to the 
findings and accept[s] the findings as valid." Mountain States 
Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1939). 
2. Should this Court leave undisturbed the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and divorce decree drafted by Petitioner's 
counsel, where the trial court repeatedly expressed its careful 
consideration of, and complete concurrence with, the same, and 
where the findings are supported by the evidence? 
"The discretion of adopting the findings as submitted to the 
trial court is exclusively in that court as long as the findings 
are not clearly contrary to the evidence." Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 
567 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah 1977). 
3. Should this Court reject Respondent's argument that the 
trial court did not enforce the prenuptial agreement and his new 
expansive interpretation of the one-page handwritten prenuptial 
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agreement, where the trial court enforced the agreement based on 
the language of the document? 
The court reviews for correctness a trial court's 
interpretation of a premarital agreement. Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 
7, fl8, 994 P.2d 193. 
4. Should this Court uphold the trial court's distribution 
of property, where the trial court ruled there was commingling of 
and improvement to assets based upon findings of fact supported by 
the evidence and where the court found equity required the division 
made? 
"A trial court has considerable discretion concerning property 
distribution in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a 
presumption of validity. . . . [The Court] disturbs such a 
distribution only when there is xa misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion.'" Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (cited and quoted authorities omitted). 
5. Should this Court affirm the award of costs and fees to 
Petitioner and award fees to her that are incurred on this appeal, 
where the trial court found that the fees were reasonable, that 
Respondent had the ability to pay the fees and that Petitioner was 
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in need of assistance to pay fees as her monthly expenses consume 
her monthly income? 
"Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of 
such fees are within the sound discretion of the trial court." 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) 
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, 
Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, 
Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness 
fees, of the other party to enable the other party to 
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include 
provision for costs of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, debts or obligations, and parties. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a divorce case. Petitioner/Appellee, Kathryn 
Brough, and Respondent/Appellant, Richard Brough, began cohabiting 
on December 1, 1997 and married on July 14, 1998. R. 366. 
Petitioner filed her Petition for Divorce on August 30, 20 05, R. 2-
4, the trial court conducted a bench trial on July 9, 2008, R. 315-
16, and the trial court signed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on August 28, 2008. R. 350-71. In general, the court awarded 
Respondent the value of his premarital trucking business and his 
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separate property in Randlett, and the court divided equally the 
properties acquired or improved during the marriage, comprised of 
a crane business and a home. 
Respondent's position at trial was that the Petitioner should 
take nothing from the marriage, R. 303-14; 598:256,260, and that 
she should further pay the costs for the court-ordered appraisal of 
the crane business, including paying for Respondent's time with the 
court-ordered appraiser. R. 598:264. Petitioner's posture was that 
she was entitled to an equitable interest in the family business 
and the home and she should be reimbursed for her attorney fees. R. 
598:249-54,264-68. Once the Petitioner obtained employment after 
the parties separated, she waived her claim to alimony. 
Following the entry of the trial court's decree, Respondent 
filed several motions. On September 25, 2008, the trial court held 
a hearing on the post-trial motions, and, after receiving argument 
from counsel, the trial court denied the post-trial motions. R. 
5 99. Respondent then appealed. 
Proceedings Below 
Petitioner filed her Petition for Divorce on August 30, 2005. 
R. 2-4. Respondent's Answer was filed on September 27, 2005. R. 16-
20. The trial court, after a hearing on October 13, 2005, entered 
a temporary order. R. 23. Petitioner filed a Motion to Order 
Appraisals on June 19, 2006, asking that the family business, 
Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. (Brough Trucking) be 
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appraised. R. 43-45. Respondent filed his response in opposition on 
July 10, 2006. R. 51-78. On July 17, 2006, Respondent's counsel, 
Mary Ann Hansen, filed her Notice of Withdrawal. R. 79-80. On July 
25, 2006, Respondent's second attorney, Dusten L. Heugly, filed his 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel. R. 91-92. The trial court 
entered its Ruling on the appraisal motion on August 8, 2006, R. 
96-97, and its Order on August 21, 2006, instructing Respondent to 
cooperate with an appraiser and to pay the costs of the appraisal 
of the business. R. 98-100. On September 5, 2007, Randall Gaither, 
current counsel for Respondent, entered his appearance. R. 152-53. 
After completion of the appraisals and discovery, the trial court 
held a bench trial on July 9, 2008. R. 315-16. At the conclusion of 
the trial, the trial court made some brief comments, aigreed to 
enter findings and an order divorcing the parties (Mr. Gaither was 
requested to prepare these documents) and requested each party to 
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and a 
proposed decree as it related to the division of the assets. R. 
598:268-70. Both parties submitted their proposed documents. R. 
323-71. The trial court adopted Petitioner's proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and decree and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. R. 350-71. 
On September 12, 2008, Respondent filed his Motion to Stay 
Judgement and Request to Submit, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, 
Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Motion for 
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Relief from Judgment and Order, Motion for New Trial, Memorandum in 
Support of Pending Motions and Notice of Hearing. R. 387-480. 
Petitioner filed a memorandum in opposition to Respondent's 
motions. R. 493-502. On September 25, 2008, the trial court held a 
hearing on Respondent's motions and, after argument, denied the 
motions. R. 599. The trial court also entered the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and the divorce decree prepared by Mr. 
Gaither divorcing the parties. R. 504-08. The trial court's Order 
(on the September 25th hearing) denying Respondent's post-trial 
motions was entered on October 14, 2008. R. 517-19. This appeal 
followed. R. 510-11. 
Facts 
The following recitation of facts essentially reproduces the 
findings of fact adopted by the trial court, with additional 
detail, and includes references to the record. Additionally, at the 
end of each paragraph, there is a citation to the corresponding 
finding(s) entered by the trial court. 
Petitioner worked for NJ Trucking, a small trucking company 
owed by Respondent, from 1993 to 1995. R. 598:9-10. She then worked 
for her former husband, Bobby Baum, until they separated in 1997. 
R. 598:10, In September of 1997, she again started working for NJ 
Trucking. R. 598:11. On December 1, 1997, the parties started 
living together and they married on July 14, 1998. R. 598:11,13. 
(Findings 2-3, R. 3 66) . 
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At the time the parties married, Respondent had two minor 
children from a previous marriage. R. 598:13. One of the reasons 
the parties married was to assist Respondent in obtaining custody 
of those two minor children. R. 598:13-14. (Finding 4, R. 366). 
Respondent also had two older children who were of majority 
age. R. 598:13. Those children insisted that Petitioner sign a 
prenuptial agreement. R. 598:14-15. Respondent stated that he 
thought the request was dumb. R. 598:15. Petitioner, to appease the 
two children, called an attorney, but, when informed of the cost of 
preparing a prenuptial agreement, elected to write out a brief 
statement which she and Respondent signed. R. 598:15. (Finding 5, 
R. 366). 
That statement provides: UI Kathryn Curfew Baum am in no way 
associated with and hold no claim to any personal properties, 
assets or money of Richard James Brough, N.J. Trucking Inc., the 
Glass Store, any personal or family properties. Also I will not be 
liable for any debts that occure [sic] from any of the above 
properties. Richard James Brough will not be liable for any debts 
that Kathryn Curfew Baum has acquired." Addendum A. 
Prior to drafting and signing the document there was no 
discussion as to or disclosure of what each party owned, R. 598:16-
17, and, at the time, Petitioner was not aware of what was in NJ 
Trucking. R. 598:16. The intent of the document was that it apply 
to assets owned on the date of marriage and not to any after-
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acquired assets or improvements to assets. R. 598:16. (Finding 5, 
R. 366) . 
At the time of the marriage, Mr. Brough owned a business 
called the Glass Shop that no longer exists, R. 598:17, family 
property in Randlett, R. 5 98:17, a home in Duchesne that had a 
large mortgage against it, R. 598:221-22, and a small trucking 
business called NJ Trucking. R. 598:16. Mr. Brough was also 
purchasing acreage in Bandana Ranches for which payments continued 
to be made during the marriage. R. 598:223. (Finding 6, R. 365). 
At the time of the marriage, NJ Trucking had some vehicles, 
trailers and equipment. R. 598:217-20; Resp.'s Trial Ex. 27 (2006 
Federal Summary Depreciation Schedule). At the time of the trial, 
NJ Trucking no longer existed and its few remaining assets were in 
Brough Trucking. R. 598:32-33. NJ Trucking had been valued by Mr. 
Brough at $44,000 a few years prior to the marriage in Mr. Brough's 
prior divorce. R. 5 98:218. At the time of trial, some equipment 
remained from NJ Trucking, and the cost to acquire that equipment 
when it was new was $93,124.00. Resp.'s Trial Ex. 27. The 
depreciated value of the equipment at the time of trial was 
$3,151.00. Resp.'s Trial Ex. 27. The 1999 financial records and tax 
return show that NJ Trucking had gross income of $188,785.00. 
Pet.'s Trial Ex. 28 (1999 Tax Return). (Finding 7, R. 365). 
After the parties' marriage, the parties changed NJ Trucking 
and started Brough Trucking. R. 598:30. They purchased a crane for 
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$130,000 and other heavy equipment and went into the crane and 
oilfield related business, incurred debt to purchase the equipment 
for which both parties were liable, and changed the name to Brough 
Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. R. 598:30-33,219; Resp.'s Trial 
Ex. 27. Respondent remained the sole shareholder. R. 598:147-48. In 
2004, the year before the parties separated, the gross income had 
increased to $785,250.00. R. 598:221; Pet.'s Trial Ex. 29 (2004 Tax 
Return). Both parties worked for Brough Trucking. R. 598:23,33-34. 
They seldom took salaries and paid for most of the family and 
personal expenses from Brough Trucking, including items such as 
vehicles, fuel, clothing, utilities, furniture and groceries. R. 
598:34,86,95,138-39,213. The parties personally and jointly took 
out a $160,000.00 loan that was used to pay off the debt on the 
crane and other equipment. R. 598:47,219. The marital home was used 
as collateral for the loan. R. 598:47. The net value of Brough 
Trucking at the time of the trial was $492,000.00. Pet.'s Trial Ex. 
3 (Townsend appraisal). (Finding 8, R. 364-65). 
When the parties started living together and at the beginning 
of the marriage, they lived in a home in Duchesne that was owned by 
Respondent, which was subject to a substantial mortgage, requiring 
$1,300.00 per month payments to be made during the marriage, 
598:221-22. Those payments were made from earnings of the parties 
and Brough Trucking. R. 598:222. Petitioner, with her own labor and 
the assistance of her son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including 
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making a room out of the patio, adding walls and windows, taking 
out a sliding glass door to open up an area, painting, installing 
sheet rock, carpet and siding, and replacing the old shower with a 
new bathtub. R. 5 98:19-21,116-18. She also remodeled the downstairs 
and added a wall, installed sheet rock, painted and added carpet, 
put in light fixtures, and did yard work. R. 598:19-21,116-18. 
(Findings 9-10, R. 364). 
Shortly after the parties married in September of 1998, 
Respondent's son, Bryan, age 14, came to live with the parties. R. 
598:22. He wanted to go to school in Roosevelt. R. 598:22. Just 
prior to the parties starting to live together, Respondent had 
purchased a shop in Roosevelt to use for Brough Trucking. R. 
5 98:25. That shop was dirty and needed repairs. R. 598:25. The 
parties decided to construct living quarters in the Roosevelt shop, 
to enable them to move to Roosevelt to accommodate Respondent's 
son's desire to attend school there. R. 598:25. (Finding 11, R. 
364) . 
Petitioner, primarily by herself, but with assistance of her 
children, Respondent's children and a few others, built a bedroom, 
bathroom and living area upstairs in the Roosevelt shop. R. 598:25-
27,118-19. Her work included installing walls, electrical wires, 
sheet rock, tile and carpet. R. 598:25-27,118-19. Downstairs, she 
put in 2 bedrooms, a kitchen, cleaned the shop and added floor 
tiles. R. 598:25-27,118-19. Carpets were added to all living areas 
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and an office was constructed downstairs. R. 598:26. (Finding 12, 
R. 363-64). 
In August of 1999, Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda, age 
12, came to live with the parties. R. 598:28. The parties and the 
children moved from Duchesne to the living quarters in the 
Roosevelt shop. R. 598:28. (Finding 13, R. 363). 
From the time the Respondent's children moved in with the 
parties, Petitioner acted as the children's mother, R. 598:29,121. 
She did laundry, cooking and cleaning for them, dealt with them 
when they were skipping school and helped them graduate from 
school, spent money out of her personal accounts to purchase items 
for the children such as school pictures, vehicle tires and a truck 
battery, among other things, and gave the children spending money. 
R. 598:29,35,57. (Finding 28, R. 358-59). 
The parties lived in the Roosevelt shop for roughly two years. 
R. 598:36. About the time they moved into the shop, they started 
looking for a house. R. 598:36. Petitioner looked at many-
properties but did not find anything acceptable to both peirties. R. 
598:36. In the summer of 2000, the parties talked to a man named. 
Clare Duncan, who said he had some acreage for sale. R. 5 98:36. 
The parties inspected the property, approximately 18 acres near 
Neola, Utah, and made an offer of $50,000.00. R. 598:36-37. That 
offer was accepted and the transaction closed on August 3, 2000. R. 
598:37-39. The parties paid $20,000 down and jointly signed a 
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promissory note for the balance of $30,000.00. R. 598:37-38. The 
property was deeded jointly to the parties. R. 598:38. The 
$20,000.00 down payment was paid from NJ Trucking, just as 
virtually all other family bills were paid from NJ Trucking and 
Brough Trucking. Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(a); R. 598:24. (Finding 14, 
R. 363) . 
After purchasing the acreage, the parties had blueprints 
prepared, based upon a floor plan Petitioner found, and the parties 
retained a general contractor. R. 598:40. Construction on the home 
started in early 2001. R. 598:40. Petitioner was responsible for 
coordinating the work. R. 598:40. She went to the construction site 
on a daily basis. R. 598:40. In addition to coordinating with the 
contractors, she picked up materials and also worked on the home. 
R. 598:40-41. The home is a large log home, and Petitioner was the 
person who chinked (put putty) between the logs. R. 598:41. She 
often worked from dawn until dusk on tlle home. R. 598:119-20. 
(Finding 15, R. 362-63). 
During the home-building process, Respondent fired the general 
contractor and Petitioner then took over the completion of the 
home. R. 598:40-43. Additionally, in July of 2001, Respondent broke 
his foot and was unable to help on the home, and was also unable to 
work at Brough Trucking for about a year. R. 598:46,210. 
Petitioner, with limited assistance from others, did the insulating 
of the home, completed the sheet rock installation (utilizing about 
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12 0 sheets) , built a fruit room, constructed a gun room for 
Respondent, and painted, wallpapered and carpeted the home. R. 
598:42-44. The parties and Respondent's two children moved into the 
home on Thanksgiving of 2001. R. 598:45. Petitioner also did the 
landscaping, including putting in the yard, trees and an orchard, 
a sprinkling system, and a fire pit. R. 598:45. She constructed a 
fence, which Respondent later replaced with a pipe fence. R. 
598:45. Once the pipe fence was in place, Petitioner painted it two 
times per year. R. 598:45. Petitioner put in a swimming pool, which 
Respondent desired, and worked on the wood deck. R. 598:44-45. 
(Finding 16, R. 362). 
The monies for constructing the Neola home and yard were paid 
primarily from Brough Trucking while some payments were made from 
Respondent's personal checking account and some from Petitioner's 
personal checking account. Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(a); R. 598:68-69. 
The value of the home at the time of trial was $325,000.00. Pet.'s 
Trial Ex. 1 (Barneck appraisal) . It is owned by the parties in 
joint tenancy. R. 598:37-38. (Findings 17-18, R. 362). 
During the marriage, Respondent worked for NJ Trucking and 
later Brough Trucking (except for the year from the summer of 2 001 
until the summer of 2002 when his leg was broken). R. 598:14 7,210. 
Petitioner was involved in the remodeling and building of the 
living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and she 
also worked at Brough Trucking. R. 598:18-23,25-26,29,33,40-
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4 6,54,91-92. She did everything from cleaning the shop, to 
secretarial work, to driving a truck on occasions as needed. R. 
598:11,33,248. The parties seldom took salaries from the business 
but rather elected to pay their living expenses and debt thru the 
business. R. 598:23,34,54-55,213. W2 records indicate that 
Petitioner was paid $3,360 in 1999, $10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in 
2001, $7,680.00 in 2002 and $6,876.00 in 2003. R. 598:93-95; 
Resp.'s Trial Ex. 10. While Petitioner took regular salary checks 
for her work for the company prior to the marriage, after the 
marriage, she took salary only on occasion, R. 598:94, because the 
parties were "[t]rying to build things together." R. 598:23. For 
the entire year of 1999, when Petitioner remodeled the Duchesne 
home, began working on the Roosevelt shop and worked regular 
workdays in Roosevelt, commuting with Respondent from Duchesne to 
Roosevelt, she took only $3,360 as salary. R. 598:22-23,95. 
(Finding 19, R. 361-62). 
The parties maintained separate checking accounts, R. 598:34, 
but both were signatories on the account for Brough Trucking, and 
living expenses were paid by both parties out of the company 
account. R. 598:34. When Petitioner did take the occasional 
paycheck, she deposited her checks into her account and then used 
those monies for the parties' animals, landscaping for the Neola 
home and for Respondent's children who would ask her for cash. R. 
598:35,94. Respondent deposited monies in his account and used the 
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funds primarily to pay child support and legal fees in the early 
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses after 
obtaining custody of his two children. R. 598:222-224. Since the 
parties took minimal salaries, almost all living expenses, food, 
utilities, transportation, housing (including the remodeling of the 
shop and Duchesne house, mortgage payments and building of the 
Neola home) were paid from Brough Trucking. R. 5 98:24,34,42,138-
39,222,233-34. (Finding 19, R. 361). 
During the course of the marriage, the parties sold some of 
the properties that existed at the time of the marriage. The 
Bandana Ranch property was sold on August 22, 2000, and the funds 
received were deposited into Respondent's personal checking 
account. R. 598:227-28. The Duchesne shop was sold on May 3, 19 99. 
The down payment of $28,983 was received, and deposited in the NJ 
Trucking account where it was used on trucking expenses. R. 
598:224-26. A check for the Duchesne shop in the amount of $54,000 
was deposited in the NJ Trucking account on May 1, 2000, R. 
5 98:232, and was used to pay company expenses. R. 598:226. Some 
used oilfield equipment including a derrick was sold and the monies 
deposited in the NJ Trucking account or Respondent's personal 
account. R. 598:178-79,198. (Findings 22-24, R. 360; Conclusions 6-
8, R. 353-54). 
On October 9, 2002, the parties borrowed $160,000.00 and 
jointly signed a promissory note for $160,000.00. R. 598:47; Pet.'s 
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Trial Ex. 13 (Promissory Note) . The family home was used as 
collateral. R. 598:47. The money was used to pay off the loan on 
the crane and other equipment titled in Brough Trucking, to secure 
a lower interest rate and to pay expenses caused by the 
Respondent's inability to work because of his broken foot. R. 
598:47-48,244. Respondent testified at trial that, because of his 
broken leg and his inability to work for a year, the money was 
needed to keep Brough Trucking operating. R. 598:168-69. (Finding 
25, R. 359). 
After completing the construction of the home in Neola, the 
parties decided to further expand Brough Trucking. R. 598:48. In 
March 2004, they purchased 80 acres in Ballard to be used for a 
gravel pit and fill dirt. R. 598:48-50; Pet.'s Trial Ex. 20-22. The 
80 acres was titled in Brough Trucking. R. 598:50. Petitioner 
remodeled an old trailer house which was moved to the property to 
be used as a scale house and office. R. 598:91-92. That remodeling 
entailed extensive work, including work on the inside and outside 
of the trailer. R. 598:92. The purchase price for the 80 acres was 
paid thru Brough Trucking. R. 598:171. (Finding 26, R. 359). 
In May 2004, the parties jointly acquired 4 acres with 
utilities adjacent to the 80 acres. R. 598:51-52. The 4 acres were 
titled in the names of the parties as joint tenants. R. 598:52. The 
purchase price was paid thru Brough Trucking 598:172. Later, 
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the parties deeded that property to Brough Trucking. R. 598:53. 
(Finding 27, R. 359) . 
Shortly after Respondent's daughter, Amanda, turned 18, she 
and Petitioner had an argument. R. 598:56-57. Respondent then told 
Petitioner to vacate the home. R. 598:57. Petitioner left the home 
on August 1, 2005, taking very few personal items with her. R. 
598:57-58. She came back the next day and loaded some items into a 
horse trailer. R. 598:58-59. Respondent, however, took back the 
horse trailer with most of the items. R. 598:59. The personal 
property is all used and has minimal value. R. 598:96-102. 
(Findings 29-30, R. 358). 
After the parties separated, Petitioner, who is in her mid-
fifties and did not graduate from high school, R. 598:7-8, obtained 
employment as a laborer with Stanco Insulation, installing 
insulation on lines, tanks and buildings in the oilfield. R. 
598:60. At the time of trial, Petitioner resided with and cared for 
her mother. R. 598:60. She had purchased, for $10,000, a used 
trailer to set up next to her mother's home, and she is making 
payments on the $10,000 owed. R. 598:88. Her net monthly income at 
trial was $1,656.00 with expenses of $1,695.00 per month. R. 598:6; 
Pet.'s Trial Ex. 5 (Financial Declaration). (Finding 31, R. 358). 
Respondent, meanwhile, continues to reside in the Neola home 
and to operate Brough Trucking. R. 598:145-47. He continues to pay 
17 
his personal expenses including legal fees through Brough Trucking. 
R. 598:137-38. (Finding 32, R. 358). 
IIUMiM »F in i >1 AK^UMEN'l 
1. Respondent fails to marshal the evidence that buttresses 
the trial court's decision, but rather advances a version of the 
facts he believes sustains his position that he is entitled to all 
the property. That position is not supported by the evidence, was 
not agreed to by the court and, because Respondent fails to marshal 
the evidence, should be rejected by this Court. 
2. The trial court's procedure in having the parties prepare 
proposed findings and a decree does not offend Utah law. A court 
may exercise this option to assist the court in making its final 
decision and may even adopt proposed findings without amendment, as 
long as the court agrees with the proposed documents and they are 
not clearly contrary to the evidence. In this case, the trial court 
repeatedly expressed its careful consideration of and agreement 
with the findings and they are supported by the record. 
3. The trial court properly interpreted and applied the 
terms of the prenuptial agreement when it divided the property. The 
language of the document supports Petitioner's argument as to the 
meaning of the document. Additionally, even if the meaning were 
unclear, Petitioner's explanation as to the purpose of the 
agreement and the parties' actions support the trial court's 
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interpretation thereof, and Respondent offered no testimony as to 
an alternative interpretation. 
4. The facts fully support the trial court's finding that 
the parties had commingled assets, had used earnings from their 
marital labor to improve, acquire and enhance assets and that the 
Petitioner had substantially enhanced the value of the business and 
homes thru her efforts. Respondent's efforts to trace monies from 
the sale of assets fell short, as Respondent's testimony as to 
certain alleged traceable transactions conflicted with the evidence 
and Respondent further conceded that the monies he deposited from 
the sale of separate properties were not segregated, but were 
placed in company accounts and used for general business and 
personal purposes. Moreover, given the circumstances of the case, 
it would be manifestly inequitable to deprive Petitioner of any 
interest in the properties. 
5. The court properly awarded Petitioner the fees she 
incurred for the divorce. Respondent does not challenge the 
reasonableness of the fees and does not claim that Respondent is 
unable to pay court-ordered costs and fees. Petitioner's monthly 
expenses fully deplete her monthly income, and she is in need of 
assistance to pay her fees. Petitioner should also be awarded the 
fees she incurs on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, AND THE COURT SHOULD 
NOT CONSIDER HIS OBJECTIONS TO HE FINDINGS. 
Rule 24(a) (9) • ::d: the I Jta 1 1 R"i L of Appellate Procedure 
requires that " [a] party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.'' 
The party must "then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even in viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below." Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 
P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993) (quoting Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins., 
776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989)). Meeting the marshaling mandate 
requires more than including "some evidence that supports the . . 
. findings," West v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^16, 48 P.3d 888, and, if 
"the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, [the Court] 
refuse [s] to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and 
accept [s] the findings as valid." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage, 872 P. 2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Mountain 
States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d at 553). 
Expanding upon these precepts, this Court, in West Valley City 
v. Majestic Investment Co., explained the marshaling obligation as 
follows: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's 
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from 
the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
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competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince 
the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon 
the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (1991) (emphasis in original). 
Respondent falls substantially short of meeting the marshaling 
threshold. He makes no attempt to assume the persona of "devil's 
advocate." Due to the procedure the trial court employed in having 
the parties prepare proposed findings and the court's adoption of 
Petitioner's proposed findings, the findings of fact made by the 
trial court are, with minor exceptions, replicated in the fact 
section above. Those findings, as illustrated by the citations, are 
supported by the record. Yet, in his recitation of the facts, 
Respondent outlines his account of events and resolves all factual 
disputes in his favor, without referring to facts that undermine 
his stance and that support the trial court's determinations. In 
short, he fails to marshal the evidence, and Petitioner 
respectfully submits that the Court should not contemplate 
Respondent's assault on the findings. 
II• THE PROCEDURE OF HAVING EACH PARTY SUBMIT PROPOSED 
FINDINGS AND A DECREE IS CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN UTAH 
COURTS AND THE COURTS ADOPTION OF PETITIONER'S 
FINDINGS WAS APPROPRIATE, WHERE THE COURT AGREED 
WITH THE FINDINGS AS DRAFTED, AND THE FINDINGS ARE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
As indicated in State v. James, "to assist a trial court in 
making the necessary findings for a particular case, the court may 
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request counsel to submit proposed findings."1 858 P. 2d 1012, 1015 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). And, u [t]he discretion of adopting the 
findings as submitted to the trial court is exclusively in that 
court as long as the findings are not clearly contrary to the 
evidence." Boyer Co., 567 P.2d at 1114. 
In James, before rendering its decision, the trial court asked 
the parties to submit memoranda and asked the State to prepare 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 858 P. 2d at 1015. 
The defendant noted its objections to the findings in a filing with 
the court. Jd. The court then signed the State's findings. Id. 
Later, the court held a motion hearing and the trial judge "again 
denied the [defendant's] motion, stating that his view of the facts 
was consistent with the findings of fact which he had signed." Id. 
On appeal, the * [d]efendant . . . claim[ed] that the trial 
court should not have adopted . . . the findings . . . prepared by 
the State because the[] findings did not truly reflect th[e] . . . 
court's own assessment of the evidence. [The] [d]efendant further 
argue[d] that the findings [we]re inconsistent . . . with both the 
evidence and the . . . court's earlier oral findings." 858 P.2d at 
1015. 
l 
See also Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah 
1998) ("The law is well settled that a trial court may ask counsel 
- typically the prevailing counsel - to submit findings to aid the 
court in making . . . necessary determinations."). 
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In affirming the trial court, this Court instructed that, 
w[w]hen there is inconsistency between a memorandum decision and 
written findings and conclusions, it may be that the trial judge 
has changed his or her mind," id., and that "[i]n determining 
whether the trial court adequately participated in adopting 
findings prepared by counsel, Utah's appellate courts look to the 
record and will affirm the findings if there is xno indication from 
the record . . . that the trial court failed to adequately 
deliberate and consider the merits of the case.'" Id. (quoting 
Automatic Control Prod. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 
1260 (Utah 1989)). In other words, "findings . . . adopted verbatim 
by a trial court are considered to be those of the trial court 
judge and may not be rejected out-of-hand, but they will stand if 
supported by the evidence." James, 858 P.2d at 1015. 
Similarly, in Tel-Tech, the district court judge, at the 
conclusion of the trial, "took the case under advisement, allow[ed] 
both parties to submit memoranda, and later requested both parties 
to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law." 780 
P.2d at 1260. The party whose findings were not selected appealed, 
"contend[ing] that the trial court erred in mechanically adopting 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepaired and submitted 
by counsel for Tel-Tech without modifying or changing them in any 
respect." Id. The appellate court ruled that u[t]here [wa]s no 
indication from the record . . . that the trial judge failed to 
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adequately deliberate and consider the merits of the case," id., 
and, in so doing, noted that the court permitted both parties to 
submit memoranda and proposed findings. Id. 
Additionally, the appellant in Tel-Tech further contended (as 
Respondent does in this case) that it was not notified of the 
court's signing of the findings. Jd. The appellate court rejected 
that argument as well, stating: 
Nor was there any error in the failure of the trial court 
to notify ACP's counsel promptly after he had signed his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment. 
Our rules do not require the court to give notice but put 
the burden on counsel to check periodically with the 
clerk of the court as to the date of entry of the 
findings and judgment so that post-trial motions may be 
timely filed. 
Id. 
In the instant case, at the conclusion of the trial, the trial 
court judge expressed his intent to take the matter under 
advisement, and then stated: "I'm going to order each of you to 
prepare findings, conclusion [sic] and a decree and simultaneously 
submit those. I'm thinking 3 0 days. If you want to do it - will 
that work for both of you?" R. 598:268-69. Counsel for both parties 
responded affirmatively. R. 598:269. Respondent's counsel then 
expressed a desire to input footnotes into the proposed conclusions 
of lawr opposed to preparing a memorandum, and the trial court 
replied that either would be fine. R. 598:269-70. 
accordance with the court's order, counsel for the parties 
submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and, 
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pursuant to the court's request that both parties prepare a 
proposed decree, Petitioner's counsel prepared a decree, while 
Respondent's counsel did not. R. 598:268-69; 323-71. On September 
4, 2008, the court entered Petitioner's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and decree. R. 350-71. Petitioner's counsel, on 
that date, mailed the Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce to 
Respondent's counsel. R. 3 72-73. 
Following the entry of the decree, Respondent filed several 
post-trial motions. R. 387-478. Petitioner filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Respondent's motions. R. 493-502. The court held a 
hearing on Respondent's motions on September 25, 2008. R. 599:1-22. 
At the hearing, in response to Respondent's protestations 
concerning the court's signing of Petitioner's documents, the court 
stated: "After the trial I indicated that I wanted you to prepare 
findings, conclusions and a decree and I could pick one or the 
other or make one up somewhere in between." R. 599:2. Following 
argument by counsel, including Respondent's counsel's airguments 
concerning notes made by the court following trial, the trial court 
further explained: 
[L] et me indicate that when I reviewed both of your 
proposed findings and conclusions I did not mechanicailly 
adopt Allred's findings but they were consistent with my 
own thinking. The only reason I show you those notes from 
my dictation the day after trial was just to show you 
where I was and what I was thinking. If Allred's findings 
vary somewhat from those notes, that's fine. When I 
reviewed his I totally agreed with what he put down and 
how it was presented. 
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R 599:12. After Respondent's counsel referred to the court's post-
trial notes as findings the court replied that trie n^tes were not 
"intended t : be pai : - the court i_^_. . . ;. : tpar ed • I I 
599:13. The court then commented: "I don t want the record that 
goes tc tl le C :>i :i i: t : f i appeals t :> . . . sa } I::l la J: tl :i :i s :i s a p i oposed 
ruling. All :i t i s is a matter of formulation of present thought 
:i r .• . : r I: 1 E :Ia y after tl: i s t::ii : :i a J a i :i :i I :l  :ii ::t:a ted tl i : se :i i 1 s : i t i E 
hurry and I didn't intend them to be actual final conclusions of 
[: 3. i c: :] decree ' R 599 : 1 3 , 
When Respondent's counsel persisted that the court had 
"essential] . . . f~,v [reri' ' : " ieter^im : \ 
: i.iia.ags ,: ^^^ ana ^ c . ^ n s ^: .-»... . ., ~n L. - . 
fourr once aaain explained- ui n-ard {• ^ ^ s e , 1 was attentiv* 
;* A__Lred's conclusions ana findings, : aid not iust mechanical,;/ 
signed them a m : "v: not going to set them aside r :99:1^-20, 
i lot •- . 
Petit Lonei ' s tindings. Both pdities L.eci iriai memoranda p n o i 
the trial, and the coi irt reviewed both memoranda before the tri a 1 
began, ^JL - -^ -. - ^.;i:ig t;ie trial, both parties offer ed 
\ roposed f indi nan of "act and cone' usions : ] a ; which wei e 
;. Lei .» .i -' •. • - ic : •! , i 1 /; I ! 323 6 7 . 
Respondent's proposal even included a memorandum reasserting his 
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theory of the case and his legal authorities. R. 324-32. Hence, the 
trial court was well aware of both parties' factual and legal 
interpretations of the case. At the post-trial hearing, as set 
forth above, Judge Anderson repeatedly expressed that he carefully 
considered the findings and did not mechanically adopt them, but 
instead agreed with Petitioner's findings in full. 
Respondent highlights a few differences between the court's 
notes from the day after trial and the executed findings. 
Appellant's Br. at 19-20. Without delving into the correctness of 
Respondent's characterization of either the court's notes or the 
findings, the court made clear that the notes were not meant to be 
findings and were made without the benefit of the record, R. 
599:13-14, and that the court agreed with findings as executed. R. 
599:19-20. Moreover, as mentioned in James, even "[w]hen there is 
inconsistency between a memorandum decision and written findings 
and conclusions, it may be that the trial judge has changed his or 
her mind." 858 P.2d at 1015. 
Respondent also alleges that the trial court committed an 
"unconstitutional abdication of basic judicial authority and an 
illegal delegation of judicial function." Appellant's Br. at 21. In 
the context of a case involving court commissioners, this Court 
opined: 
[C]ore judicial functions include: "(1) the power to hear 
and determine controversies between adverse parties and 
questions in litigation, (2) the authority to hear and 
determine justiciable controversies, (3) the authority to 
27 
enforce any valid judgment, decree, or order, and (4) all 
powers that are necessary to protect the fundamental 
integrity of the judicial branch." 
Buck v. Robinson, ^^. .:.. . 6 18 (quoting Sta te 
v. Thomas, 961 P ?6 ? ^  ?>o? -Utah 19^8) .emphasis removes • , 
C :>re j udicIai L unc Liuna , iiuw •- u^ not inc 1 uuc 
functions that are generally assij:.-; to 'assist' courts, 
such as conducting fact finding hearings, hold.ng 
pretrial conferences, and making recommendations to 
judges. In these instances i ill t.i ma1~^ judicial power 
remains with the "Midge." 
Buck, 20 0'8 IJT App 2 8 " juotmg Salt hake city v. Ohms, 8 81 P. 2d 
544 , T[- 1 n . ! .Tt ah 1 - :4 
< :. , dif f ei: ences between part 11; s \ 11"J 
court commissioners, core -judicial functions remain unchanged, and 
* ' i i ii I i" n , r p r i ' " i I i i i 111 11 • i i r r p T l d * 3 1 i I 
•udicial role, but rather sought the parties' assistance, in 
'~^r' * - . order, by asking the parties to 
prepare propose-; .-naingL of fact and conclusions of !^w. 
Respondent's counsel concurred at the time the court invoked the 
procedure . J O . J C - and raised constitutional concerns only 
after r e c e i v m q -v* unfavorable result. In any case, the cxn irt 
r e t a i i i e d :i t s = s s e i 11 i a 3 r o 3 e 1
 2 - ,.. .,* e - - ;:3 11: I e f :i i I a 3 d e :: :i s i o i :i i V s i 1 " < :i 
court pointed out at the post trial hearing; the couxt uc: i 
i - »r [ s e t s o f f :i n d :I i l g s ] o :i : [ c o i :i 3 d 1 I 
ma [dj e one u}. somewhere in between," R 599:2. The court's choob.^g 
" i--n- • Lindings does not negate the court's exercising of 
its . imate discretion,, 
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Respondent further complains that he did not have the 
opportunity, under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
object to Petitioner's proposed decree. Appellant's Br. at 25. Rule 
7's provisions regarding preparation of orders by prevailing 
parties and objections by losing parties, by their own terms, apply 
in circumstances where parties are not "otherwise instructed by the 
court." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) (2) . In this case, at the end of trial, 
the court "order[ed] each of [the parties] to prepare findings, 
conclusion [sic] and a decree and simultaneously submit th[em]." R. 
598:268-69. Petitioner did so, and mailed the proposed decree to 
Respondent on August 7, 2008. R. 368. Respondent registered no 
objection to Petitioner's proposed decree with the court, and did 
not, as instructed by the court, prepare his own proposed decree. 
Moreover, the decree was consistent with the findings made by 
the court and Respondent had the opportunity to enunciate, and have 
the court address, his points of opposition to the decree at the 
post-trial hearing, R. 599:1-22, whereat the court affirmed the 
decree, while extending the deadline for Respondent to comply with 
the decree. R. 599:17. In sum, if the court erred, it was a 
harmless error under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as the court's action was not "inconsistent with substantial 
justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
Respondent also takes exception to the "argumentative" nature 
of the findings. Appellant's Br. at 26. By necessity, findings are 
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argumentative in the sense that they resoi.^ factual a.spute? Wh at 
is more, the example he cites, of the Ballard property. dr>es n-' r 
accurately ref 1 ect 11 ie f ii idings , I Ie -. 
properties - an 80 acre parcel and a 4-acre parcel :v ; one. 
Tl le f:i n iiii lgs 1 i B : 1 ia] ] ei iges ai e findi rigs 2 6 ai i :i 2 7 A/1: :i :i c l I state : 
26. After completing the home,, the parties decided to 
further expand Brough Trucking. In March 2004, they 
purchased 80 acres in Ballard to be used for a gravel pit 
and fill dirt. The 8 0 acres was titled in Brough 
Trucking. Petitioner remodeled an old trailer house which 
was moved to the property to be used as a scale house and 
office. . . . The purchase price for the 80 acres was 
paid by Brough Trucking. 
2 7. Ii i May 2 0 04, the parties jointly acquired 4 acres 
with utilities adjacent to the 8 0 acres. The 4 acres were 
titled in the names of the parties as joint tenants. The 
purchase price was paid by Brough Trucking. The parties 
fh^ -n deeded that property to Brough Trucking. 
R. 3 59. There is nothing inaccurate in tl lese findings. They 7r_~ 
supported by the record as demonstrated by references to the record 
i n this brief's statement of facts. 
Final] y Respondent refers to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules )f 
Civil Procedure. Appe^-ant:' ,:; -:. at _c .. .:.s argument on thi s 
poinr is somewhat opaque, as i.t unclear whether he is unhappy that 
11 I e • :: : i 11: t ::i :ii • ::i i i : t :i s s u e o i a 3 f :i i l d :ii i l g s 11 I a t t: 1 I e :: : • I 1 1 t :il :i • :i n c t :i s s i i e 
sufficient findings or both. Although Rule permits oral 
f :ii i id :i i igs , :i t :i :: E s i i :: t i = cji i :i i = t l lat f :i nd:i i lgs I: B I t ia de oral ] A, I: i it 
only that "tl le court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon." Utah R. Civ. r. o2 (a . 
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In addition, Respondent does not indicate any way in which the 
findings are insufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. 
Simply stated, while Respondent forcefully recounts his 
displeasure with the trial court's actions, he has not established 
either that the trial court mechanically adopted the findings or 
that there are findings unsupported by the evidence. Accordingly, 
the findings should remain undisturbed. 
III. RESPONDENT WRONGLY ARGUES THAT THE COURT FOUND A 
WAIVER OF THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, AS THE COURT 
PROPERLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED THE PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENT. 
"Premarital agreements 'concerning the disposition of property 
owned by the parties at the time of their marriage are valid so 
long as there is no fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.'" 
In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1994) (quoting Huck v. 
Huck, 734 P. 2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986)) . * [A] t their most basic level, 
premarital agreements are a type of contract and thus generally 
should be tested by ordinary contract principles," In re Beesley, 
883 P.2d at 1346, although "'[s]ince a husband and a wife do not 
deal at arm's length, a fiduciary duty of the highest degree is 
imposed in transactions between them.'" Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^20 
(quoting 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 87 (1991)). Further, 
"where there is doubt about the interpretation of a 
contract, a fair and equitable result will be preferred 
over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an interpretation 
that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted 
only where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so 
provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation 
to be given it." 
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P e i r c e , <. •_ -^  Trr 7 %3 9 (quoting Plain City Irr. Co. v. Hooper Irr. 
Co. , '*5 6 P.2d 625, 628 (Utah I960)). 
: ' > instant case, Respondent pretests t:;at i .- ' ..t *i^.- . , 
court erred :i i i adopting findings " .vaiver 
pi eni iptia] agi eeniei it. • I I ssp s B: : 
notarized prenuptial agreement was enforceable,'' Pesp 's Br at 2 . 
The t::i : :i a3 ecu n : t:, 1 i oweve] : , adopte' :i i i :: i -
premarital agreement, and, indeed, aid enrcrce tne agieemei: , 
according to its clear terms, K , 356-5^. r"N~ •1-r>--^ -r- + 
Kathryn Curfew Baum am,, in no way associate.! * M L U ana i.o^a i c : * •• 
to .. • personal properties. jnsets ,x 'money ^i Rici'iara J a-* *6 
Brougn ^cv^ng ..... ..^  ;Jlass Store, any personal ^r fami v 
properties. ;isc .-• * • ; a b > for anv debt.- that occu^e 
not be liable for any debts that Kathryn Curfev; Baum has acquire: 
* - 'd^i c i A 
-:. s trial memorandum, Respondent argued that the terse 
v.-ren; ;r-~ i a "• <. - • > • *'i>-: • 1: :: • a ] ] :: f B: : c i igl l Ti i icki i lg, 
including tht ciajit diiu atnei assets bought during the marriage, r . 
308, while he conceded that "the Neola residence rwajs net included 
•in the scope cr. irie pre-marita., centia,. .. .-. .; Now, ^ ^ 
appeal, Respondent expands his view of the agreement, claiming t- r-
i l l . I . n n j u c i y t J nipci 1.1 ;. I M IIMIIIIIIII i l l I I b i u u g h T i u u k i - u y , a,s w e l J d s = 
of the Neola home. Resp.'s Br. at 3 3 , Meanwhile, Petitioner, a t 
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trial, argued that the prenuptial agreement by its clear language 
applied only to the assets that existed at the time of the 
marriage, R. 2 96, and maintains that position on appeal. 
The trial court ruled that the agreement applied only to the 
properties existing at the time of the marriage as enumerated on 
the document. R. 356-57. The court then awarded Respondent property 
in Randlett owned prior to the marriage and a credit for the sum of 
$44,000.00, which was the value of the NJ Trucking assets at the 
time of the marriage. R. 356. The court observed that the Glass 
Shop was gone, and that the Duchesne shop and home had been sold 
with the proceeds used for the trucking company expenses.2 R. 356. 
The trial court did not find any ambiguity and applied the 
contract language according to its terms. The court's 
interpretation of the document is consistent with the language 
located therein, while Respondent's position that the agreement 
entitles him to the entirety of the business, including items 
purchased with marital earnings, and the marital home, titled in 
joint tenancy and acquired years after the marriage, is not. 
What is more, if there were uncertainty as to meaning of the 
contract, the uncontested testimony of Petitioner, and the facts 
support the distribution made by the trial court. Petitioner, in 
2 
The trial court also found that the Duchesne home lost its 
designation as separate property, because of the extensive efforts 
Petitioner made to remodel and improve the home and the fact that 
marital monies were paid on the mortgage. R. 3 54. 
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this case, testified that Respondent's elder children wanted her 
and Respondent to ha ve a prem I^L^C^ agreement. R. 598:14. 
Petitioner was agreeable to tl le idea, as she '"didn't want anything 
that [Re spondent ] ha d pr i or [ to the mar r iaqp 98:1 1. 
Respoi ident thoug 1 11: 11 I ::>i ei inpti a ] -j^^'i^ie;-. .*.aL - . " 
R. 598:15. Nevertheless, to appease the children, Petitioner 
conta cted a n a tt srne^ r t : • :i i iqi ii i e as t- : • tl le : ' : s t c: f a , ]:: i: ei iupt:i <E I 
agreement, and, when informed of the cost, chose not to retain 
counsel, JJUI - r ~-r a ro i t 11< • r f u • 1 f 
Petitioner testified, and the Respondent did not disagree, 
that the parties' intent ii i preparing the document was that si xe 
wouic not claim an interest iT . J^L Respondent had at the time of 
the marriage, but that she should have a part of anything acquired 
:i i I t: 1 i :!. f i 11 u i c , 1 1 5 9 8 1 6 a i 1 • :1 t h e parties'1 actions c o r r e s p o n d e d 
with this expression. For instance, as outlined in the next section 
company, as the parti.es were ouiidn:-- together, she was a 
" . an
 : • • - - : • • •- . . . • - , ^ : rts t : 
ua^nieSb properties, sne signea on a loan :-:•: ., i IJ . , _ i or "ompany 
expenses and ~he labored on, contributed financially to and wc s 
listed as a ~-^  tenant on the marital home. Respondent argues 
that notwithstanding her having done a.l • this and having also acted 
s teei iaa- , .aren, Petitioner should 
nonetheless be entitled to no interest i 11 the business or the home, 
due to the premarital agreement. This position does not comport 
with the language of the agreement or the parties' actions after 
signing the agreement, and would constitute severe exploitation of 
Petitioner. In any case, regardless of the attendant circumstances, 
the clear language of the agreement is consistent with the trial 
court's interpretation and the division of the property. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY 
DIVISION, WHERE PETITIONER WORKED FOR THE BUSINESS 
WITH LITTLE PAY TO BUILD THE BUSINESS AND MADE 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BUSINESS IN THE FORM OF 
CONSTRUCTION WORK PERFORMED, WHERE THE MARITAL HOME 
WAS TITLED JOINTLY AND PETITIONER PAID MONEY TOWARD 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MARITAL HOME, SUPERVISED 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOME AND DID MUCH OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION HERSELF, WHERE MONIES DEPOSITED BY THE 
SALE OF SEPARATE PROPERTY BY RESPONDENT WERE NOT 
SEGREGATED OR TRACED TO HOME CONSTRUCTION AND WHERE 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND FAIRNESS AND EQUITY DEMANDED 
THE PROPERTY DIVISION MADE, 
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the . . . property, debts or 
obligations, and parties." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1). "Marital 
property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it 
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn 
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoted 
authorities omitted). "Generally, the rule for premarital property 
is that each party retain the separate property he or she brought 
into the marriage. Some exceptions include where the property has 
been commingled so that it has lost its separate character, or 
where it is fair, just and equitable to do' otherwise." Jd. at 13.21 
(citations omitted). 
Premar i tal property ± 0 ^ ^ x L a a epcu. dit ± • .1- L 1 ^  i t y ai id 
becomes part of the marital estate if "(1; the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed 
to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that 
property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, 
or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity 
lost through commingling or exchanges where the acquiring 
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the 
other spouse. 
Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 4 0 5, f 20 , 147 P , 3d 405 (quoting 
Mortensen ' Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)). Furthe 1 ", 
u[t]he rule that property acquired by one spouse should be 
awarded t<* u.^u spouse on divorce d^es not apply . . . wl lei 1 
the acquiring spouse places ;,^ : ^  «.-.. , . . ..* names in such a 
manner as to evidence an intenr to :nar> marital property." 
Mortensen. 
more !.tr .,\i * T^ . onsider property acquired during 
" \:R' - tl :3aiJoe._ . . jdarjje: 
134, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1 9 9 0 ) , and the naking instaliment: 
" •" *; -™ari ta] property fi :om ma 1 ~~ 
commingling, .junn, 802 P. 2a CIL. 1321. 
" the distant case, Respondent argues, as he did at trial, 
::;dt -OLicioner should receive no interest 11 1 the marital home or 
the crane and trucking business. Respondent does not marshal tl le 
ti ia] :: ::>ii:i : t , ::tei isi e f :i 1 id 1 1 lgs : 1 1 tl 1 3 j: 1 : o p e i t y cl:i ? :i si • ::>i 1 :ii ssues , 
p r em i s e d up'.: 11 1 2 principles heretofore outlined, 
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consequently, his challenge to the findings should not be 
entertained. It would be both impractical due to length 
restrictions and repetitious to recite all the findings or 
citations to the record for the findings, as they may be located in 
the findings of the court and the statement of the case found in 
this brief. Suffice it to say, there is overwhelming evidence to 
support the trial court's property division with regard to both the 
trucking business and the home. 
First, as to the business, it is important to make an initial 
point. The trucking business was never operated as an entity 
distinct from the parties. Both parties worked in the business, 
even living in the shop for two years, the parties seldom took 
salaries and they paid family and personal expenses from Brough 
Trucking, including expenses such as vehicles, fuel, clothing, 
utilities, furniture and groceries. R. 598:28,34,45,86,95,138-
3 9,213. Both parties were on the trucking company account, R. 
598:34, both parties and the expert testified that the personal 
expenses of the parties were paid from the corporation, R. 
598:34,86,95,138-39,213, and both parties also testified that they 
rarely paid themselves any salary from the corporation. R. 598:23-
24,95,213-14. Indeed, Petitioner testified that she rarely took a 
salary, because Respondent and she were trying to build the company 
together. R. 5 98:23. This testimony is supported by the record. For 
instance, in 1999, the year when Petitioner remodeled the Duchesne 
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home, began working on the Roosevelt shop and worked regu] ar 
workdays in Roosevelt, commuting with Respondent from Duchesne to 
Roose velt, si le took 01 ily $3,361 jalary : J. ~_ ^ . 
W2 records indicate that Petitioner was paid salary of $1 64 0 JO 
'3:93-95; Resp.'s Trial Ex. :C. An.;, Petitioner usea the salary 
pa :i :i f : •: : 1:1 I a fa i i: i:i ] } .- • . • -^. 
5 y 8 : $ s . 
Moreover, Petitioner made valuable c ,_* 
business. She engaged in a hoc*- of activities ; oi . IIL- company s 
benefit, such as clean1, ncr th^ shoo,
 S o > — 1 ^ : as secretary, driving 
one d m e t u c K s wnen neeaea, a.,j sign^n^ „:. _.^ u_:.t ^ ^ a:;., t^ pay on 
the crane an;i other assets - \ *< 47-48,248. She reniode ! -d 
i ^e 
corporation r. 598:25-28,91-92. Petitioner alsr cai-a : i 
to the completion of high school, though they were not her children 
by either b ] ood * , 5 9«-?» 
strengthened Respondent. ^ custody posiLiuh u s - d - v i s rus exwii-, 
and allowed him to devote time, to the business. Petitioner even 
disbursed money to Respondent's children out c,. wl lat little pay she 
took from the business-'. r 598:35. She sianed with P^^p^nd^n*- •: .* a. 
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The business increased dramatically in value over the course 
of the marriage. In 1999, near the beginning of the parties' 
marriage, the trucking business made $180,000. R. 598:220. By 2005, 
prior to the parties' separation, the business earned $843,000. R. 
598:220. The reason for this increase in value was the acquisition 
of the crane and other assets and the additional work those assets 
provided. R. 598:30-33. These additional assets were acquired 
during the marriage, with income earned during the marriage and a 
personal joint loan. R. 598:30-33,219. 
Next, Respondent argues that Petitioner should receive no 
interest in the marital home. Resp.'s Br. at 35. There are, 
however, at least three important points supporting the trial 
court's awarding of half of the value of the home to Petitioner. 
First, regardless of any contributions made to the home by 
Petitioner or the tracing of the construction costs to separate 
property, the parties titled the home in joint tenancy, evincing an 
intent to hold the property jointly. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 3 07. 
They also signed jointly on the promissory note for the purchase of 
the acreage upon which the home is located. R. 598:37-38. 
Second, Petitioner made vast contributions to the home, even 
doing much of the construction work. She searched for suitable 
locations for a home, R. 5 98:36, and the home's blueprints were 
based on a floor plan she found. R. 598:40. Once building began, 
Petitioner was responsible for spearheading the effort. R. 598:40. 
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She went to the construction site on a ja-., ~a.si> .m. : . In 
addition to coordinating with the contractors, she picked up 
matei ,a:s ana physically Loi ]<'"'ll mi < I I , 
: :\c ] uciinq putting putty between the logs of the large structure. R,. 
When, during the home-building process, Respondent fired the 
g e i 1 e i a 1 • : "  4 ' '* " I: e t ,:i t:„ „ii o i i e :i : a s s i :i„ n t e d,„ 11 : e s p o ,;n„ s i 1: ,:i ] :ii t;;;;! f :: i t h e 
culmination : * r. • - construction. 1 1 5 9 8:40-43. With 1 im,ited 
a ssi stance fv others, she insulated the home, completed the sheet 
rock installation, built a fruit room, constructed a, gun room, for 
Respondent, and painted wallpapered and carpeted, the home. R,„. 
598:42-44. Petitioner a_.sc u-.* the landscaping, . : m g } Jii,;g 
. :: the yard, trees and -i:i orchar-; ^ sprinkling system and •:-* lire 
i 1 ] :i c l i, , : 
replaced with a pipe fence. •• .^8:45. Once the pipe fence /;as <n 
Petitioner put ::; <* s/.imming pot,. A:_ . Responaent aesirea, ai.d 
v worked : i i tl i = \ • : • : • :!, :i, = : ] : 1 1 5,9 8 : -^ . Respondent, meanwhile, did 
not work on tl le home. R 593:46. Simply stated, Petitioner played 
the prominent, part in the parties' home-b\ lilding endeavor, 
Finally, Respondent claims that nearly a,l„] :>f the paymei its for 
home construction came from, the trucking company accounts and a 
p e r s oi i.a 1 ace on in: I t I le s ]:: • • 3 B :i : a t 10 I 2 1 ,:i t :ii oi le i: :ic» e s . • . * , 
that the bulk of the construction costs were paid from, the truckii i,g 
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company. R. 598:42. As repeatedly noted in this brief, the trucking 
company paid nearly all of the parties' personal expenses. 
Respondent and Petitioner worked for the company but rarely took 
any salary, as they were attempting to build the business. R. 
598:23,34. (Because the parties took minimal salaries and paid 
personal and construction expenses through the business, 
Respondent's contention that Petitioner has no interest in the home 
is essentially akin to claiming that one's spouse is entitled to no 
portion of the equity in a home purchased during the marriage with 
the mortgage payments coming from the other party's salary, even 
though the salary of the paying spouse constitutes marital 
earnings.) Additionally, considering her minuscule compensation, 
Petitioner's payment of roughly $1,400 from her separate account 
toward the home and landscaping should not be summarily discounted, 
R. 598:93, and Respondent accords no economic value to Petitioner's 
sweat equity. 
Respondent's attempts to trace alleged premarital monies to 
the home were misleading and flawed. (The court made substantial 
findings on this claim showing the failure of the Respondent to 
trace any premarital monies to the home. See Findings 20-24 and 
Conclusions 2,3,6-8, R. 360-61,353-56.) For example, Respondent 
claims that the roughly $30,000 he received from the sale of the 
Duchesne shop in May 1999 was used to build the Neola home in 2001. 
Resp.'s Br. at 9; R. 598:224-25. However, by June 30, 1999, the 
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money from the sale of the Duchesne shop which had been deposited 
into the trucking company account in May was gone. ^. J 9 8 : ^ 2 5 - ? ! . 
Similarly, Respondent claimed that the money from the sale < : <=> 
Bandana Ranch property was used for the down payment -hf N P " \ 
- '- p - " " R 5 9 8 I 2 2 6 b l I t t l l e i : a i i u a l K \ r • ::i i IL J i 
proper!:;/ was * .- , \ ^ntiJ August 22, 2000, while the down payment 
- t} ' sever al wee] is . i e i : i :i i mg List 3 , 
2 0 00, and the down payment was made by NJ Trucking rather than 
Respr * ^ r* ' • ; "-- 'lr - rom tl ie sa 1 e wen : e depc^i t :] ; 4 o 
Respondent t Liia..iaudi dccoun, . Resp s "Trial Ex.. . \: 
598:227-28. There were deposits of $30,000, on April 12, 2< and 
$54,000, on June 1 ~>nnn ^ni.. ziie NJ Trucking account wh;cn t^e 
Respondent al • ^ aed we?- fro^ the sale of either the shop or nome n 
Duchesne. I I :c.^^^; .-_jp. , _. b) ' Oi l Apri; 
just weeks after the f.isl: deposi* * here was only $1,49 i: :;he :JJ 
!'ur the companies' expenses : : •.  June 2C "' deposit, ^receded t::e 
pi ircha se • :: f tl ie Ne c ] a pi: opert} :ii i :i A i i g i ist 2 0 00 a i l :I :: ::>i: istri ict: c i i • : f 
the Neola home, commencing, in J anuary 2 0 01, by several months. 4 R. 
3 
At trial, . ere was little if any evidence showing the 
deposits were from the sale of premarital assets as opposed to 
deposits of monies received on accounts payable for services 
provided to others by the company. All the monies were commingled 
and used to pay company expenses, 
\ 
The trial court also tww;^ that ti^ ^ uchesne home and Bandai la 
Ranch properties should not be credited against marital property, 
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598:230. Respondent cites a $50,000 deposit on May 17, 2001, 
Resp.'s Br. at 9, but that amount was deposited into a money market 
account, and Respondent does not trace that amount from the money 
market account into spending on the home. R. 598:178, Resp.'s Trial 
Ex. 15(b). Respondent also claims other deposits into the NJ 
Trucking account from alleged sale of equipment. R. 598:179; 
Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(b). 
With the exception of the deposit into the money market 
account, for which Respondent established no ties to spending on 
the home, and the Bandana Ranch property sale which Respondent 
claimed was intended to pay the down payment for the Neola land 
(although the money was received after the down payment and the 
down payment was made by NJ Trucking rather than Respondent 
individually, though money from the sale of the Bandana Ranch went 
into an individual account), Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(a); R. 598:227-
28, all of the deposits Respondent claims went into either the NJ 
Trucking or Brough Trucking account. They were not segregated to 
pay for the Neola home, and, indeed, Respondent conceded that the 
monies received from the sale of the properties were not separated, 
but were simply lumped into the trucking company account and used 
to pay trucking company bills including the expenses of the company 
due to the expenditure of marital income to pay installment 
payments on the properties' mortgages and the extensive 
improvements to the Duchesne home made by Petitioner. R„ 354. 
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for the year the Respondent ^ i eg was broken and he did not work. 
i-.. 5 9R:226; Finding -
^v. ir „- absence of 
commingling,, nevertheless award separate property "where it 
I < i L i , | 11, > I < 1111 I t t j u L I ri J i \J : , " bumi, i» u '  'I- » | ill I 'i 1 \--t-
raised this issue in the trial memorandum., R. 292-94, and . ;: *• =; 
a r g i im e i I t a t t: i: :ii a ] 1 <: 2 6 6 6 8 , a i l ::i t h e t: r :i a 3 :: c • i 1 1 t: f c i 11 i :i 11 I a 
the circumstances, as enume.ra.ted by the court, "fairness an-, equity 
require [d] " the propertv distribution ordered 1: y * 1l • * 4 ^r ^ . 
^T THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT' *% 
OF COSTS AND FEES TO PETITIONER, WHERE 1 HI 
WERE REASONABLE, PETITIONER HAS ' r~v 
RESPONDENT HAS THE ABILITY TO PAY 
vl *. naptc. ..,^vorce , 
m e court ma;, order a party to pay the costs attorney fees, a„i id 
• ' > • ' : -.i- .er pa,i t^ t : • 
enable the other party to prosecute or detend ; -\^ actior i i 
"ode clc a " * - i s 
J:.U ,ue amouiiu ui sue:: lees die Aithrn the sound discretion of t ,.e 
trial court." Crouse. 81? P. 2d at 840. The "award must be based on 
evidence v..; io reasonableness of the requested fees, as well, as 
the. financial need of the receiving spouse, and the ability of tl le 
o the i spous e J" • • i. 
Respondent does not argue that Petitioner's attorney fees were 
i ii lreasoi i,a„b] e 
reasonable. 3 b 1. J 57 - 58 . L'he tna i -ourt also found, that 
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Petitioner's net monthly income was $1,656.00, while her monthly 
expenses, not including attorney fees, were $1,695.00, R. 358; 
Pet.'s Trial Ex. 5 (Financial Declaration) , that Petitioner had not 
been able to pay the fees she accumulated prior to trial and that 
"she d[id] not have the means to pay the additional fees incurred 
in preparation for the trial and the trial." R. 357,352. Moreover, 
the court found that Respondent continued to pay personal expenses, 
including legal fees, through Brough Trucking, R. 3 51,3 58, and that 
"Respondent, having the full control of Brough Trucking, ha[d] the 
much greater ability to pay the expenses including appraisal costs 
and legal fees in th[e] case." R. 3 51. The court found that, the 
year prior to the parties' separation, Brough Trucking had income 
of $785,250.00. R. 365. See Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, [^31 ("Of 
particular relevance are the trial court findings that Husband 'had 
the greater ability to pay attorney fees, ' and that Wife had a 
greater need for financial assistance. By making these findings, 
the trial court comported with the [statutory] requirements . . . 
.") . 
In short, the trial court made findings as to each of the 
three requisite elements in assigning fees and costs. Furthermore, 
Respondent does not quarrel with the court's findings with respect 
to either his ability to pay or the reasonableness of the costs and 
fees. Resp.'s Br. at 43-47. 
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Respondent does posit that Petitioner could afford to pay 
attorney fees, because ushe had four or five separate credit cards 
. . . and she could have used [them] to make payments on attorney's 
fees." Resp.'s Br. at 46. Respondent does not, however, explain how 
Petitioner could then pay off her credit card balances, 
particularly with the added interest, when her monthly expenses 
completely consumed her monthly income. 
Respondent further protests that Petitioner has a promissory 
note with counsel for attorney fees, Resp.'s Br. at 45, while 
Petitioner clearly denied there was any promissory note. R. 598:75. 
Respondent also presses for Petitioner to pay the costs and fees 
from of the property award she received. Resp.'s Br. at 46. While 
Petitioner will receive property, she needs the property as she 
prepares for retirement and to supplement her income, which is 
already exhausted by her expenses and does not afford her any 
leeway for unexpected or additional expenses. 
As the trial court found, during the marriage, Petitioner took 
a small wage and will receive far less in social security than she 
would have if she had been paid the full amount for her services. 
R. 353. Indeed, Petitioner rarely took money out of the company, 
because she and Respondent were trying to build the company 
together and she was "trying to save money" for the company. R. 
598:23. Consequently, Petitioner did not set money aside for 
herself. 
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At age 55, R. 3 53, and without having graduated from high 
school, R. 598:8, Petitioner's employment prospects are 
constrained. As noted, at the time of trial, Petitioner was working 
as "a laborer" for an insulation installer. R. 598:9. Meanwhile, 
Respondent was awarded Brough Trucking, which Petitioner helped to 
expand and which has paid Respondent's legal fees in this action, 
and he has the potential to continue enjoying substantial income 
therefrom. 
VI. PETITIONER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS ON APPEAL. 
In Lyncrle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (1992) this Court 
instructed that "[g]enerally, when the trial court awards fees in 
a domestic action to the party who then substantially prevails on 
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." This 
statement of law is widely accepted in Utah as the general rule. 
See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ; Hill v. 
Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Potter v. Potter, 845 
P. 2d 272, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In such cases, the Court 
"remand [s] for entry of reasonable fees . " Lyngle, 831 P. 2d at 1031. 
Petitioner, having been awarded attorney fees at the trial court, 
should be awarded the fees and costs she incurs on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests 
that the Court affirm the trial court's decision as to all issues 
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before the Court on appeal and award Petitioner the fees incurred 
on appeal. 
DATED t h i s I (day of June 2 00 9 
ALLRED &/MCCIJ.ELLAN, P .C. 
A t t o r n e y s f o r A p p e l l e e / P e t i t i o n e r 





d D. BrotfrSrson 
48 
ADDENDUM 
A. Premarital Agreement 
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
C. Decree of Divorce 
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IKATHRYN CURFEW BAUM AM tN NO WAY ASSOCIATED WITH AND HOLD NO CLAIM TO 
ANY PERSONAL PROPERTIES, ASSETS OR MONEY OF RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, N.J. 
TRUCKING INC., THE GLASS STORE, ANY PERSONAL OR FAMILY PROPERTIES. ALSO I WILL 
NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT OCCURE FROM ANY OF THE ABOVE PROPERTIES. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT KATHRYN 
CURFEW BAUM HAS ACQUIRED, 
KATfiRYNCURFfiWBAUM 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH 








CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435)722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, ) Civil No. 054000084 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
The above case came before the Court for trial on the 9th day of 
July, 2008. Petitioner was present with her attorney, Clark B Allred. 
Respondent was present with his attorney, Randall Gaither. Evidence was 
received by the Court in the form of testimony and exhibits. Argument 
was received by counsel and the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and after being fully 
advised, makes these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner was a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah, 
and had been for more than three months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. The Petitioner worked for the Respondent from 1993 to 1995. 
She then worked for her husband, Mr. Baum, until they separated. In the 
summer of 1997, she again started working for the Respondent at NJ 
Trucking. 
3. On December 1, 1997, the parties started living together and 
they married on July 14, 1998. 
4. At the time the parties married, the Respondent had two minor 
children from a previous marriage. One of the reasons the parties 
married was to assist the Respondent in obtaining custody of those two 
minor children. 
5. The Respondent also had two older children who were of 
majority age. Those children insisted that the Petitioner sign an 
agreement not to claim any assets the Respondent then owned if the 
parties divorced in the future. The Respondent stated that he thought 
the request was dumb. The Petitioner, to appease the two children, 
called an attorney, but, when informed of the cost of preparing a 
prenuptial agreement, elected to write out a one paragraph statement 
which she and the Respondent signed which is Respondent's exhibit 1. 
There was no discussion or disclosure of what each party owned. The 
testimony of the Petitioner, which was not rebutted, was that the 
statement was only to apply to assets owned on the date of marriage and 
not to further acquired assets or improvements to those assets. 
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6. At the time of the marriage, the Respondent owned a business 
called the Glass Shop that no longer exists, family property in Randlett 
(to which the Petitioner has made no claim) , a home in Duchesne that had 
a large mortgage against it, and a business called NJ Trucking. He was 
also purchasing acreage in Bandana Ranches. 
7. At the time of the marriage, NJ Trucking had some vehicles, 
trailers, and equipment. NJ Trucking had been valued at $44,000 a few 
years earlier in the Respondent's prior divorce. The cost to acquire the 
equipment that remains from NJ Trucking, based on Exhibit 27, was 
$93,124.00. Its present depreciated value is $3,151.00. The 1999 
financial records and tax return shows that NJ Trucking had gross income 
of $188,785.00. 
8. After the parties' marriage, the parties changed and expanded 
the NJ Trucking business. They bought a crane for $135,000 and other 
heavy equipment and changed the name to Brough Trucking and Crane 
Service Inc. Respondent remained the sole shareholder. In 2 004, the 
year before the parties separated, the gross income had increased to 
$785,250.00. Both parties worked in the business. They seldom took 
salaries and paid most of the family and personal expenses from Brough 
Trucking. The parties personally and jointly took out a $160,000.00 
loan that was used to pay off the debt on the crane and other equipment. 
The marital home was used as collateral for the loan. The net value of 
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Brough Trucking at the time of the trial is $492,000.00. See Exhibit 3 
Townsend appraisal. 
9. When the parties started living together and at the beginning 
of the marriage, they lived in a home in Duchesne that was owned by the 
Respondent. That home was subject to a substantial mortgage on which 
$1,300.00 per month payments were made during the marriage. Those 
payments were made from earnings from Brough Trucking. 
10. The Petitioner, with her own labor and the assistance of her 
son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including making a 2:00m out of the 
patio, adding walls and windows, taking out a sliding glass door to open 
up an area, painting, installing sheet rock, carpet and siding, and 
replacing the old shower with a new bathtub. She also remodeled the 
downstairs and added a wall, sheet rocked, painted and added cairpet 
downstairs, put in light fixtures, and did yard work. 
11. Shortly after the parties married in September of 1998, the 
Respondent's son, Bryan, age 14, came to live with the parties. He 
wanted to go to school in Roosevelt. Just prior to the parties starting 
to live together, the Respondent had purchased a shop in Roosevelt from 
Drillers Inc. to use for Brough Trucking. That shop was dirty and 
needed repairs. The parties decided to construct living quarters in the 
Roosevelt shop so that they could move to Roosevelt. 
12. The Petitioner, primarily by herself, but with assistance of 
her children and the Respondent's children, built a bedroom, bathroom 
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and living area upstairs in the Roosevelt shop including sheet rock, 
tile work and carpet. Downstairs, she put in 2 bedrooms, a kitchen, 
cleaned the shop and added floor tiles to the shop. Carpets were added 
to all living areas and an office was constructed downstairs. 
13. In August of 1999, the Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda, 
age 12, came to live with the parties. The parties and the children 
moved from Duchesne and started living in the Roosevelt shop. 
14. The parties then started looking for a more suitable home or 
property on which to construct a home. The Petitioner looked at many 
properties but did not find anything acceptable to both parties. In the 
summer of 2000, the parties were talking to a Clare Duncan who said he 
had some acreage for sale. The parties went and looked at the property, 
approximately 18 acres near Neola, Utah, and made an offer of 
$50,000.00. That offer was accepted and the transaction closed on 
August 3, 2000. The parties paid $20,000 down and jointly signed a note 
for the balance of $3 0,000.00. The property was deeded jointly to the 
parties. The $20,000.00 down payment was paid from Brough Trucking just 
as all other bills were paid from Brough Trucking. 
15. The parties then took plans and hired a general contractor. 
Construction on the home started in early 2001. The Petitioner was 
responsible for coordinating the work. She went to the construction 
site on a daily basis. In addition to coordinating with the 
contractors, she picked up materials and also worked on the home. The 
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home is a log home, and the Petitioner was the person that chinked (put 
putty) between the logs. 
16. The Respondent then fired the general contractor so the 
Petitioner took over the completion of the home. Additionally, in the 
summer of 2001, the Respondent broke his leg and was unable to help on 
the home or to work at Brough Trucking. The Petitioner did th€> 
insulating of the home, completed the sheet rock, built a fruit room, 
constructed a gun room for the Respondent, and painted, wallpapered and 
carpeted the home. The parties and the Respondent's two children moved 
into the home at Thanksgiving of 2001. The following summer (2002) , the 
Petitioner did the landscaping, including putting in the yard, trees and 
an orchard, sprinkling system, fire pit and painting the fences. Later, 
she constructed a deck and swimming pool. 
17. The monies for constructing the home were paid primarily from 
Brough Trucking and some payments were made from the Respondent's 
personal checking account and some from the Petitioner's personal 
checking account. 
18. The present value of the home is $325,000.00 which is less 
than the parties paid to construct the home. It is jointly owned by the 
parties. 
19. During the marriage, the Respondent worked at Brough Trucking 
(except for the year summer of 2001 to the summer of 2002 when his leg 
was broken). The Petitioner was involved in the remodeling and building 
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of the living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and also 
worked at Brough Trucking. The parties seldom took salaries from the 
business. W2 records show the Petitioner was only paid $3,360 in 1999, 
$10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in 2001, $7,680.00 in 2002 and $6,876.00 in 
2003. Both parties maintained separate checking accounts. The 
Petitioner deposited her checks in her account and then used those 
monies on the home, the family, and expenses for both her children and 
the Respondent's children. Respondent deposited his monies in his 
account and used those to pay child support and legal fees in the early 
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses during the 
marriage. Since the parties took minimal salaries, almost all living 
expenses, food, utilities, transportation, housing (including the 
remodeling of the shop and Duchesne house, mortgage payments and 
building of the home) were paid with checks or credit cards from Brough 
Trucking. 
20. The Respondent claimed that he should have credit against the 
value of the home for premarital assets that were sold. However, the 
evidence did not support that claim. He was unable to trace those assets 
and monies. The evidence showed that monies from the sale of assets 
were used for purposes other than the home including paying operating 
expenses of Brough Trucking when the Respondent had a broken leg. 
21. Respondent claimed that the money from the sale of the Bandana 
Ranch was used for the down payment of the 18 acres in Neola where the 
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home was built. First, that property was paid for during the marriage. 
Secondly, the 18 acres in Neola closed on August 3, 2000. The Bandana 
Ranch was not sold until August 24, 2000 and the account the $18,512 
went into was used to pay many different living and personal expenses . 
22. Respondent claimed the money from the sale of the Duchesne 
shop should be a credit. He sold that shop on May 3, 1999. The down 
payment of $28,983 was two years before the home was constructed and the 
monies went into the general account at NJ Trucking and was spent for 
expenses of NJ Trucking. The balance of the purchase price was 
apparently received in 2000 (a year before the home was constructed) and 
also went into the Brough Trucking general account and was used for 
Brough Trucking expenses. 
23. Respondent also claims a credit of $30,000 for a rig he sold 
in June 2 0 00 and other equipment he sold in 2000. Again, those sales 
occurred well before the construction of the home, those monies went 
into the general account at Brough Trucking and they were spent before 
the land was bought or the home was constructed. 
24. Respondent also makes a claim for the $24,702.00 received from 
the sale of the Duchesne home in April 2002. That home had been 
substantially improved and remodeled by the Petitioner and marital 
monies were used to pay mortgage and taxes on the property. There* was 
no showing where that money was deposited and no showing it was used on 
the Neola Home. 
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25. On October 9, 2002, the parties borrowed and jointly signed a 
promissory note for $160,000.00. The home was used as collateral. The 
money was used to pay off the loan on the crane and other equipment. 
Respondent testified that, because of his broken leg and his inability 
to work for a year, the money was needed to keep Brough Trucking 
operating. The money apparently was used to pay off the debt on the 
crane and some other vehicles to reduce the monthly obligations of 
Brough Trucking. 
26. After completing the home, the parties decided to further 
expand Brough Trucking. In March 2 0 04, they purchased 80 acres in 
Ballard to be used for a gravel pit and fill dirt. The 80 acres was 
titled in Brough Trucking. Petitioner remodeled an old trailer house 
which was moved to the property to be used as a scale house and office. 
That remodeling included framing, insulation, sheet rock, and wiring. 
The purchase price for the 8 0 acres was paid by Brough Trucking. 
27. In May 2004, the parties jointly acquired 4 acres with 
utilities adjacent to the 80 acres. The 4 acres were titled in the 
names of the parties as joint tenants. The purchase price was paid by 
Brough Trucking. The parties then deeded that property to Brough 
Trucking. 
28. The Petitioner was the primary person involved in raising the 
Respondent's two children. She helped and encouraged them in school, 
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did the cooking, cleaning and laundry. She also paid some of their 
expenses from her bank account. 
29. Shortly after Amanda turned 18, she and the Petitioner had an 
argument. The Respondent then told the Petitioner to vacate the home. 
The Petitioner vacated the home on August 1, 2 0 05, taking very few 
personal items with her. She came back the next day and loaded some 
items into a horse trailer. The Respondent, however, took back the 
horse trailer with most of the items. 
30. The personal property is all used property and has minimal 
value. The values listed by the Respondent are either new values or 
exaggerated. 
31. After the parties separated, the Petitioner obtaiined 
employment as a laborer with Stanco Insulation. She presently resides 
with her mother. She has purchased a used trailer she is setting up 
next to her mother. Her present net monthly income is $1,656.00 and her 
expenses are $1,695.00 per month. 
32. The Respondent has continued to reside in the home and operate 
Brough Trucking and continues to pay his personal expenses thru Brough 
Trucking. 
33. Petitioner has incurred legal fees and costs in this matter. 
The affidavit of the Petitioner's attorney shows that she had incurred 
$15,391.53 in fees thru July 2, 2008. He testified that he had incurred 
an additional 10 hours in preparation prior to trial at $175.00 per 
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hour. In addition, there was the time of trial and the post-trial work. 
The affidavit sets forth in detail the work that was provided and the 
hourly rates charged. In addition, the Petitioner paid $400.00 for the 
appraisal of the home. 
34. The Petitioner has made some payments on her legal fees but, 
based on her income and expenses, she has not been able to pay those 
fees and she does not have the means to pay the additional fees incurred 
in preparation for the trial and the trial. 
35. Respondent did not request reimbursement of legal fees in his 
pleadings. At trial, he requested that he be reimbursed for the costs 
incurred in providing information to the appraiser of Brough Trucking. 
There is also approximately $7,000.00 still owing for that appraisal. 
The appraisal of Brough Trucking was based on an order of the Court. 
Respondent was ordered to pay that expense with the Court reserving the 
right to reallocate that expense. The appraisal was needed and helpful 
to the Court in valuing the assets and deciding the division of the 
assets. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes: 
1. The one paragraph prenuptial agreement was not negotiated by 
the parties. There was no disclosure of assets in the prenuptial 
agreement and it was prepared mainly to appease the older children. It 
was intended to be limited to what the Respondent owned at the time of 
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the marriage as listed on that document. Items listed included the Class 
Shop, the family properties m Randlett, and the assets in NJ Trucking 
at the time of the marriage. At the time of the marriage, the 
Respondent had also purchased the Roosevelt shop, and had the Duchesne 
shop and the Duchesne home. Those properties were not listed on the 
agreement, were not disclosed and became marital properties because oi 
the marital funds used to pay for and enhance those assets and the 
enhancements and improvements made by the Petitioner x The facts that the 
Petitioner improved the other assets, signed jointly on a $160,000.00 
loan and worked in the business also support the position that the 
agreement was limited to assets and debts existing at the time of the 
marriage. 
2. The Glass Shop no longer exists and there was no evidence that 
any of its value remains. The Petitioner made no claim to the Randlett 
properties. There was little evidence as to the value of NJ Trucking at 
the time of the marriage. The best evidence was the $44,000.00 value at 
the Respondent's prior divorce. 
3. The monies from the sale of the Duchesne shop were deposited 
in the general bank account of Brough Trucking and used for genera L 
expenses of Brough Trucking. Those monies were received prior tc the 
construction of the home and were not used m the home Since there is 
Reese v Reese, 199 9 UT 75, ^24-25; and Pierce v. Pierce, 20 00 UT 
7 11120, 27. 
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no showing or tracing of those monies to the home, there should be no 
credit given against the value of the marital assets. 
4. The parties changed the nature of NJ Trucking and changed its 
name to Brough Trucking. Petitioner was actively involved in Brough 
Trucking and in the parties' successful efforts to increase its business 
and its value. She was also actively involved in enhancing the assets 
of Brough Trucking. She remodeled the Roosevelt shop and increased its 
value. She also built the scale house for the 80 acres. She cosigned 
on the $160,000.00 note to pay for the crane and other vehicles. The 
monies to buy the crane, vehicles and land for Brough Trucking all came 
from earnings during the marriage. The parties did not treat Brough 
Trucking as a separate entity but paid all marital bills and living 
expenses from Brough Trucking. The business and personal expenses were 
commingled to make it impossible to determine what was personal and what 
was business. Even though Brough Trucking's stock was in the 
Respondent's name, it is a marital asset less the $44,000.00 value at 
the time of the marriage. 
5. The Roosevelt shop, though titled in the Respondent's name is 
used in and is part of Brough Trucking. The valuation of Brough Trucking 
by Mr. Townsend included the value of the shop. As noted above, the 
Petitioner greatly enhanced the value of that shop by cleaning it and 
building living quarters on the shop. The shop should be included in 
Brough Trucking and is a marital asset. 
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6. The Duchesne house was subject to a mortgage when the parties 
married which mortgage was paid from earnings during the marriage. The 
home was also remodeled and improved by the Petitioner during the 
marriage. The monies from the sale of the house were deposited in a 
general account which was spent for general living and business 
expenses. There was no tracing or showing that the monies from the sale 
of the Duchesne house went into the Neola house. In addition, those 
monies became marital assets because of the use of earnings during the 
marriage to pay the mortgage and taxes and the remodeling by the 
Petitioner. 
7. The Bandana Ranch property was being purchased during the 
marriage with earnings from the marriage. The money from the sale of 
that property did not go to the down payment on the Neola property, as 
claimed by the Respondent, but was spent on general expenses. There 
should be no credit against marital assets given for those monies. 
8. The Respondent also claimed credit for a rig and other 
property he asserted that he sold and used the proceeds to pay on the 
Neola house. The Respondent originally denied having any documents to 
support his claim of premarital assets. Shortly before trial, he 
provided some documents and tried to introduce additional documents at 
trial which the Court refused to receive because they had not be timely 
disclosed. There was evidence of $3 0,000.00 from a rig. There was no 
evidence showing that those monies went into the home, but rather those 
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funds went into the Brough Trucking account and were spent on Brough 
Trucking expenses.2 
9. The Neola home was purchased jointly by the parties and 
remains titled in both parties' names. The Petitioner was the primary 
person involved in the construction of that home, including doing much 
of the construction herself. The monies for the construction of the home 
came from earnings in Brough Trucking, from Petitioner's account where 
she deposited her salary and from the Respondent's account where he 
deposited his salary. It is a marital asset. 
10. The Petitioner was actively involved in the expansion of 
Brough Trucking, she remodeled two living quarters and built the Neola 
home, she raised the Respondent's two children thru their teenage years 
and she was the person doing the cleaning and meals. The Respondent's 
position, that all property was premarital and that Petitioner should 
get no interest in it, would leave the Petitioner, at age 55, with 
nothing. The small wage she was paid results in less social security 
when she reaches retirement age than if she had been working for full 
wages. Fairness and equity require that she receive one half of the 
value of the Neola home and Brough Trucking (less $44,000 . 00) .3 Brough 
2Dunn v Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (Ut.App. 1990) pre marital assets 
that have been consumed, commingled etc loss their separate 
status. 
3 
Hocrue v. Hocpae, 831 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). See also Haumont v. Haumont, 793 
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Trucking has a value of $492,000.00 less $44,000.00 and the house has a 
value of $325,000.00. Therefore, the Respondent, if he wants to retain 
ownership of the home and Brough Trucking, should be ordered to pay to 
the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00. In the alternative, the 
Petitioner should be awarded the Neola home and property with a value of 
$325,000.00 and the Respondent awarded Brough Trucking and the 
Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner the difference of $61,500.00 and to 
refinance the $160,000.00 debt to remove the home and Petitioner from 
liability on that loan. 
11. The Petitioner should also be awarded the vehicle she drives, 
subject to the remaining debt on it as of the date the decree is signed 
and the personal property in her possession and the property listed on 
Exhibit 24. Respondent should be awarded the remaining personal 
property, the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives. 
12. Petitioner waived her claim to alimony as her income presently 
meets her expenses. However, her income is not sufficient to pay her 
legal fees and costs. The financial declaration received by the Court 
seems to be accurate and the expenses listed thereon are reasonsible. 
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^20; Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) (using marital funds to 
make installment payments on separate property changes it to marital 
property); and Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) (listing 
many factors the court considers). 
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The Respondent has had the benefit of Brough Trucking to pay his 
expenses and legal fees and he has resided in the home. The Respondent 
should be ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for the legal fees she has 
incurred. The amount of legal fees as set forth on the Affidavit 
submitted by Petitioner's attorney were necessary and the fees charged 
are reasonable.4 In addition, the Petitioner incurred 10 more hours in 
preparation and the time incurred for trial and post-trial work. An 
additional affidavit should be submitted as to the additional time 
incurred. 
13 . The cost for the appraisal of Brough Trucking was needed for 
the valuation of the business. The Respondent should be required to pay 
the balance owing on that bill. There is no basis to award the 
Respondent for expenses incurred by his secretary to provide information 
to the appraiser. The Respondent, having the full control of Brough 
Trucking, has the much greater ability to pay the expenses including 
appraisal costs and legal fees in this case. 
DATED this jJfc day of August, 
'John K. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
4Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, ) 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, ) Civil No. 0540000084 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
The above case came before the Court for trial on July 9, 
2008. The Court has entered an order divorcing the parties and 
took the remaining issues under advisement. The Court has now 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based 
thereon, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Respondent, if he wants to retain ownership of the home 
and Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. (Brough Trucking), is 
ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00 within 90 
days of the entry of this decree. He is to notify Petitioner's 
counsel within 15 days of entry of the decree if he elects to 
retain both assets. 
2. If the Respondent does not elect to retain ownership of 
the home and Brough Trucking as provided above, then the Petitioner 
is awarded the Neola home and property, the Respondent is awarded 
Brough Trucking and the Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner 
$61,500.00 for the difference in the value within 90 days of entry 
of the decree. 
3. Respondent is ordered to refinance the $160,000 debt to 
remove the home and Petitioner from liability on that loan. 
4. The Petitioner is awarded the vehicle she drives (subject 
to the remaining debt on it as of the date this decree is signed) , 
the personal property in her possession and the property listed on 
Exhibit 24. 
5. Respondent is awarded the remaining personal property, 
the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives. 
6. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
7. Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner the amount she 
has incurred in legal fees and costs in this matter. The 
$15,391.53 set forth on the affidavit submitted as Exhibit 4, 10 
hours at $175.00 per hour for preparation and 9 hours at $175.00 
2 
per hour for trial are awarded and ordered to be paid. In 
addition, the Petitioner's counsel shall submit a supplemental 
affidavit for the time spent on post-trial matters. If Respondent 
objects to the reasonableness of that amount, he shall file a 
motion with the Court setting forth those objections and the Court 
will set for hearing those objections. 
8. Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appraisal 
performed by Brad Townsend. 
9. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver, without 
delay, any titles or other documents which are presented to either 
one by the other and which are necessary to effectuate the transfer 
of property as has been hereinbefore set forth. 
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